The Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities, and Financial Law by Treanor, William Michael et al.
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 13, Number 2 2008 Article 1
The Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture
on Corporate, Securities, and Financial Law
William Michael Treanor∗ Ben A. Indek†
Jill E. Fisch‡ Paul S. Atkins∗∗
∗
†
‡
∗∗
Copyright c©2008 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
177 
 
 
LECTURE 
 
THE EIGHTH ANNUAL A.A. SOMMER, JR. 
LECTURE ON 
CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND FINANCIAL 
LAW†
WELCOME 
 
William Michael Treanor1
Fordham University School of Law 
 
OPENING REMARKS 
 
Ben A. Indek2
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Jill E. Fisch3
Fordham University School of Law 
 
FEATURED LECTURER 
 
Paul S. Atkins4
United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
† Paul S. Atkins delivered this address at Fordham University School of Law on 
October 9, 2007.  It has been edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear 
awkward in writing and to provide sources and references to other explanatory material 
in respect of certain statements by the speakers. 
 1. William M. Treanor is the Dean and Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 2. Ben A. Indek is a Partner in the securities litigation practice of Morgan, Lewis 
& Bockius LLP. 
 3. Jill E. Fisch is the T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law at Fordham University 
School of Law and is the Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Center. 
 4. Paul S. Atkins is a Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
178 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
WELCOME 
DEAN TREANOR: Hello, everyone.  My name is Bill Treanor.  
I’m the Dean of Fordham Law School.  It’s my incredible pleasure to 
welcome you to tonight’s A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. 
This is an event that speaks very profoundly to what the law school 
is about.  We have had, for a long time, one of the strongest business law 
programs in the nation.  I think a number of years ago, in the most recent 
ranking, we were ranked in the top twenty,5 and our sights are on 
moving to the very top. 
We have an incredible faculty—it’s always dangerous when I do 
this, because I can’t see everyone—starting with Professor Gus 
Katsoris,6 who I think is our most senior faculty member, and Professor 
Steve Thel.7  In the last couple of years, we have had some 
extraordinary recent hires, people who are really incredible stars and 
rising stars in the area of corporate law, Richard Squire8 and Sean 
Griffith.9  We have a fabulous corporate law journal, The Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law,10 which was actually cited in 2005 by the 
Supreme Court in the Arthur Andersen case.11  We have incredible 
alumni.  So those are really the bases for an extraordinary business law 
program. 
To top it off, we have a Corporate Center,12 which is designed to 
really mesh leading, cutting-edge theory and cutting-edge practice.  It is 
 5. See Brian Leiter’s Law School Rankings, Faculty Quality in the Business Law 
Areas 2003-04, http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2003faculty_businesslaw.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 6. Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor of Law at Fordham 
University School of Law. 
 7. Steven Thel is the Wormser Professor of Law at Fordham University School of 
Law. 
 8. Richard C. Squire is an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 9. Sean J. Griffith is a Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. 
 10. For more information, please visit the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law website, http://law.fordham.edu/jcfl.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 11. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citing 
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and 
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721 (2003)). 
 12. For more information, please visit the Fordham Corporate Law Center website, 
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/source.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
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the brainchild of John Peloso,13 joining us as one of our graduates, who 
really moved us forward and saw the possibilities of this.  Our current 
chair, Paul Soden,14 who is a great leader in the business law area, has 
dedicated himself to our Corporate Law Center.  We have one of the 
leading corporate law scholars in the country heading it, Jill Fisch, who 
is not just a brilliant corporate law scholar that has brought incredible 
energy to this program, but she also can do literally anything.  I don’t 
know if you saw her earlier moving the podium so it would be in exactly 
the right spot.  The classic “no job too big or small” describes Professor 
Fisch.  She is assisted by Professor Caroline Gentile,15 who comes to us 
with a background in economics, who has just done extraordinary work, 
and the Executive Director of the Corporate Center, Ann Rakoff,16 who 
has done a fabulous job. 
So we have a fabulous business law faculty, fabulous alumni, a 
fabulous Corporate Center, and then we have this program, which is 
really one of our gems, the A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. 
We are joined tonight by Starr Sommer.17  Thank you so much for 
coming here to be with us tonight.  As well as Susan and Jeff Futter,18 
thank you, your presence here means so much. 
Ben Indek, who really did so much to put this evening together, 
with the support of Morgan Lewis, will be doing the introduction for 
SEC Commissioner Atkins.  But I just want to say a little bit about how 
delighted we are to have him here today.  Just to put it in context, 
literally every day we have an event here in this amphitheater.  They are 
fabulous.  It’s amazing what great programs we have.  But the draw on 
this is amazing.  Not only is this room filled, with people in the back, 
but we have an overflow room, where Professor Sean Griffith is—or so I 
have been assured.  Just to put that in context, this is my sixth year as 
dean.  Eliot Spitzer did not get an overflow room;19 only John Paul 
 13. John F.X. Peloso is Senior Counsel at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP and an 
Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. 
 14. Paul A. Soden is a Partner at Thompson Hine LLP, chairman of the Board of 
Advisors of the Fordham Corporate Law Center, and an Adjunct Associate Professor of 
Law at Fordham University School of Law. 
 15. Caroline Gentile is an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 16. Ann Rakoff is the Executive Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Center. 
 17. Starr Sommer is the widow of Al Sommer, Jr. 
 18. Susan Futter is the daughter of Al Sommer, Jr. and Jeff Futter is the son-in-law 
of Al Sommer, Jr. 
 19. See The Fifth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities & 
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Stevens got an overflow room.20  [Commissioner Atkins] very 
thoughtfully did a very interesting op-ed piece21 and placed it as a way 
to kind of gin up a bigger crowd. 
This is a very special moment.  I could not be happier.  It brings 
together our business law commitment, our fabulous Corporate Center, 
one of the stars, literally, of our Corporate Center program, and a 
particularly fabulous speaker.  Without any further ado, let me present 
Ben Indek, who has done a great job in putting this all together. 
OPENING REMARKS 
MR. INDEK: Good evening, and welcome, everybody, to the 
Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. 
Morgan Lewis created this event in honor of our partner who 
started our securities law practice.  Al Sommer was a Morgan Lewis 
partner from 1979 to 1994.  At that time, he became counsel to the firm.  
Al was a giant of the securities bar, with particular expertise in corporate 
finance and accounting issues.  Al served as an SEC commissioner from 
1973 to 1976.22  Later, he was chairman of the Public Oversight Board 
of the American Institute of [Certified Public Accountants].23  In private 
practice, he was counsel to many entities and a prolific author and 
commentator on a wide range of securities law topics. 
In preparing for my remarks tonight, I found several interesting 
documents from Al’s tenure at the Commission on the SEC Historical 
Society website.24  By the way, the Historical Society is also a sponsor 
of this lecture, and we appreciate its support.  In particular, I noticed on 
Financial Law, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1 (2005) (featuring the speech delivered 
by Elliott Spitzer, former New York Attorney General and former Governor of the State 
of New York) [hereinafter Fifth Annual DeStefano Lecture]. 
 20. See John Paul Stevens, “Learning on the Job,” Remarks at the Fordham 
University School of Law Centennial Conference: The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens 
(Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://law.fordham.edu/newsfiles/news-stevens.pdf. 
 21. Paul S. Atkins, Editorial, Just Say ‘No’ to the Trial Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
9, 2007, at A17 [hereinafter Atkins, Just Say No]. 
 22. See Interview by Richard M. Phillips with A.A. Sommer, Jr., Former SEC 
Commissioner, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oralHistories/interviews/sommer/sommer11010
1Transcript.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See SEC Historical Society, http://www.sechistorical.org (last visited Feb. 7, 
2008). 
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the website several of Al’s speeches from the mid-1970s and an 
interview that he gave to the Historical Society shortly before his 
passing.  In those materials I noted certain striking similarities between 
Al and Commissioner Atkins.  Al was, and Commissioner Atkins is 
today, passionate about the securities laws.  Moreover, while at the 
Commission, both were willing to openly question the status quo. 
In a September 1973 speech regarding the role of disclosure in the 
securities markets, Al stated—and I’m quoting—“I, for one, think that it 
is good that this fundamental premise of our regulatory system be 
reviewed and criticized.”25  Anyone who has heard or read speeches 
delivered by Commissioner Atkins will know that he, too, does not 
shrink from careful scrutiny of both new and old securities law 
initiatives.  To cite one example, in his recent remarks before the 
Security Traders Association of Boston, Commissioner Atkins, in 
discussing reports critical of the U.S. capital markets, stated his belief—
and I’m quoting again—“that the Commission is duty-bound to analyze, 
understand, and, if warranted, respond to these and other report 
recommendations that pertain to us.”26  In today’s Wall Street Journal, 
as Dean Treanor mentioned, the article that Commissioner Atkins put in 
an op-ed, the Stoneridge case, is another example of his frank comment 
on topical issues.27  I am confident that Al would have relished the 
opportunity to listen to the candid views of Commissioner Atkins 
tonight. 
Al was present at the first two lectures to introduce our speakers, 
but passed away in 2002, after a long illness.  His family continues its 
close relationship to our firm and to participate in these lectures.  As 
mentioned by Dean Treanor, we are joined here tonight by his wife 
Starr, his daughter Susan, and his son-in-law Jeff.  We are honored that 
they could attend this lecture. 
Al joined our firm twenty-eight years ago to establish and expand 
the securities regulatory practice.  Today we have more than 100 
lawyers in seven cities throughout the country devoted to providing 
 25. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, “Required Documentation in the Stock 
Market: The Other Side,” Address Before the Conference Board 4 (Sept. 27, 1973), 
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1973_0927_Sommer 
Disclosure.pdf. 
 26. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the Security Traders 
Association of Boston (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2007/spch091307psa.htm. 
 27. See Atkins, Just Say No, supra note 21. 
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advice regarding the securities laws.28  We practice in the regulatory, 
enforcement, litigation, broker-dealer, investment adviser, investment 
company, public-company accounting, and corporate governance 
areas.29  In short, we continue to broaden and strengthen the foundation 
Al originally built.  We are proud of Al’s affiliation with Morgan Lewis 
and delighted to sponsor this annual lecture in his honor. 
I am pleased to cede the podium to Jill Fisch, Director of 
Fordham’s Corporate Law Center and our host this evening.  Thank you 
for coming. 
INTRODUCTION 
PROF. FISCH: Good evening.  I’m Jill Fisch and I’m Director of 
the Fordham Corporate Law Center. 
On behalf of Fordham Law School, I want to take this opportunity 
to thank Ben Indek and to extend a particular thanks to the firm of 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius for establishing the Sommer Lecture and for 
their continued support and partnership with the law school.  I know 
many alumni of the Morgan Lewis firm are here tonight.  The firm has 
really gone out of its way to help make this a very special event.  I am 
delighted that our good friends, the members of Al Sommer’s family, 
are here and continue to attend this event.  It’s just delightful to have 
them.  I am pleased that the SEC Historical Society continues to come 
and partner with us.  Of course, I want to welcome SEC Commissioner 
Paul Atkins. 
This evening’s lecture, the A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture, is one of the 
capstones of our program here at the Corporate Law Center.  As you 
know, our speakers have included a panoply of leaders from the SEC,30 
the NASD,31 and the PCAOB.32  Last year we reached across the 
Atlantic to hear from Margaret Cole,33 Director of Enforcement at the 
 28. See Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, http://www.morganlewis.com (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2008). 
 29. See id. 
 30. United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  For more information, 
please visit the SEC website, http://www.sec.gov/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 31. National Association of Securities Dealers.  The NASD consolidated into the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in July 2007.  For more information, 
please visit the FINRA website, http://www.finra.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 32. Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board.  For more information, 
please visit the PCAOB website, http://www.pcaobus.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 33. The Seventh Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and 
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U.K. Financial Services Authority34—or, I should say, the FSA, as long 
as I’m on acronyms.  At other recent events, we hosted—then New York 
Attorney General, now Governor—Eliot Spitzer35 and Congressman 
Oxley.36  I want to point out that Congressman Oxley also did not 
command an overflow room. 
Our upcoming programs include a roundtable on directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance,37 an academic conference featuring Vice 
Chancellor Leo Strine38 as the keynote speaker, and a terrific lecture 
series geared specifically for our students.  We are delighted with the 
work that our student partners are doing on the Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law, which, let me point out, is one of the first 
specialized business law journals in the country.  I want to thank the 
Journal students for their work here tonight as well. 
SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins was appointed to the Commission 
in 2002, making him the longest-serving current member of the 
Commission.39  Incidentally, he was appointed on July 29, 2002, which, 
according to my records, is the day before the effective date of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.40  His tenure, particularly in those challenging 
times, adds a degree of stability to a Commission that has experienced 
both numerous challenges and fairly frequent personnel changes, and is 
obviously continuing to experience those changes. 
Financial Law: “The U.K. FSA: Nobody Does It Better?,” 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 259 (2007) (featuring the speech delivered by Margaret Cole, U.K. FSA Director of 
Enforcement) [hereinafter Cole Lecture]. 
 34. For more information, please visit the FSA website, http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 35. See Fifth Annual DeStefano Lecture, supra note 19; see also Fordham 
Corporate Law Center, Highlights of Prior Programs, http://www.fordham.edu/law/fac 
ulty/fisch/priorprograms.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 36. See Fordham Corporate Law Center, Highlights of Prior Programs, 
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/priorprograms.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2008); see also Michael G. Oxley—Biography, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/bio 
display.pl?index=O000163 (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 37. See Fordham Corporate Law Center, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fis 
ch/source.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 38. See Leo Strine—Biography, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20of%20 
Chancery/?jud_off.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 39. See Paul S. Atkins—Biography, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/atk 
ins.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Atkins Biography]. 
 40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
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Commissioner Atkins also adds a degree of stability to the 
Commission’s regulatory policy.  I think it’s fair to describe his 
perspective, in general, as that of a classic conservative, in that he has 
tended to oppose overzealous regulatory reactions in response to high-
profile scandals.  In the mutual fund area, for example, we had the 
scandals dealing with late trading and market timing.41  He repeatedly 
opposed the Commission’s rules requiring greater director independence 
and a separate chairman, arguing that the rules were not cost-justified 
and that they would fail to solve the conflict-of-interest problems in the 
industry.42  His views were vindicated when the D.C. Circuit struck 
down the rules.43
He vigorously opposed hedge fund registration, arguing that the 
Commission had failed to consider other viable alternatives.44  Once 
again, the courts agreed with him.45
Most recently, Commissioner Atkins has criticized the strong 
regulatory reaction to the options backdating scandals, observing that the 
scandals have, in many ways, obscured the fact that options are and 
remain a legitimate and desirable form of executive compensation.46
Commissioner Atkins brings to these varied topics a common 
perspective: that regulators should hesitate to step in and interfere with 
the market’s ability to discipline business practices.  As he told Business 
Week—and I quote—“Markets have great power to discipline people.  
We shouldn’t try to second-guess them.”47
The interplay between regulation and the markets raises complex 
issues in a number of areas that are currently before the SEC.  The 
Commission continues to struggle with the implementation of Sarbanes-
 41. See Edward Chancellor, Editorial, Scandals Seem Bad Now? Just Wait, WALL 
ST. J., May 27, 2006, at B14. 
 42. See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not 
Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1473 (2002). 
 43. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(vacating the 75% independent director and independent chair requirements). 
 44. Kim Clark, SEC Commissioner: More Financial Regulation Not Needed, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 11, 2007. 
 45. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 46. Helen Shaw, Atkins Warns of Overreaction in Options Furor, CFO MAG., July 
7, 2006, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7155885/c_7154782. 
 47. Amy Borrus, Dr. No Digs in at the SEC; Commissioner – and Fierce 
Libertarian – Paul Atkins is Slowing Some Key Reforms, BUS. WK., Feb. 14, 2005, at 
76. 
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Oxley, particularly with the regulation of the accounting industry.48  The 
scandals that led to the statutory reform raised critical questions about 
the extent to which we should defer to self-regulation and industry 
standards, particularly with respect to those who, by statute, are 
responsible for safeguarding the integrity of public-company financial 
statements. 
The Commission faces ongoing challenges in overseeing the 
conversion of our exchanges and market structures to private, for-profit 
entities, entities with increasingly global operations and increasingly 
complex ownership structures.49  And the Commission must decide how 
to reconcile its decades-long, intensive oversight of the solicitation of 
proxies with market pressures that are placing increasing importance on 
shareholder voting, pressures that include greater shareholder efforts to 
nominate directors, “say on pay,” and the increasing importance of 
professional proxy advisers.50
Commissioner Atkins is prepared for these challenges and 
welcomes the opportunity to carefully consider the changing role of SEC 
regulation in protecting the capital markets.  As you saw from this 
morning’s op-ed piece, he has given a lot of thought to these issues.51  
Let me make it clear that, while he and I don’t share the same 
perspective on all of these topics—some of you may be aware that I 
filed an amicus brief on the other side of the Stoneridge case,52 the case 
that was argued before the Supreme Court today—I cannot express 
enough respect for the knowledge, the expertise, and the care that he 
brings to his viewpoints and his perspectives. 
 48. Timothy L. Weston, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Under Siege: Solutions for 
Solving the Problems of Implementing Section 404, CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP., Spring 
2006, at 86. 
 49. See A Review of Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Markets: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Mar. 9, 2006) 
(testimony of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Sec. Industry Ass’n), available at SIFMA, 
http://www.sifma.org/legislative/testimony/archives/Lackritz3-9-06.html; Aaron 
Lucchetti, As Exchanges Become Profit-Seekers, Concerns Rise Over Risk to Investors, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005. 
 50. See Jeremy Grant, Call to Postpone SEC ‘Proxy Access’ Vote, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2007. 
 51. See Atkins, Just Say No, supra note 21. 
 52. See Brief for Professors James D. Cox et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 
(2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701606. 
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Raised in Florida, Commissioner Atkins spent more than twenty 
years focusing on the financial services industry and securities 
regulation.  Prior to his appointment, his work included internal 
compliance investigations and consulting for financial firms.  In the 
largest of these investigations, he served as Crisis President—which I 
think is a cool title—for the sole surviving subsidiary of the Bennett 
Funding Group, a billion-dollar leasing company that perpetrated the 
largest Ponzi fraud in U.S. history, in which more than 20,000 investors 
lost much of their investment.53  By stabilizing the company’s finances 
and operations and rebuilding the firm’s business, Commissioner Atkins 
improved firm share value by almost 2,000%.54
From 1990 to 1994, Commissioner Atkins served on the staff of 
two former chairmen of the SEC, Richard Breeden and Arthur Levitt, 
ultimately as executive assistant and counselor, respectively.55  Under 
Chairman Levitt, he was particularly involved in the SEC’s efforts to 
educate individual investors, efforts that included organizing the first 
investor town hall meetings, an SEC consumer affairs advisory 
committee, and the original Invest Wisely brochures regarding the 
fundamentals of the retail brokerage relationship and mutual fund 
investment, topics that, as I said, continue to be of great importance 
today.56
Commissioner Atkins received his J.D. from Vanderbilt University 
School of Law, where he was senior student writing editor of the 
Vanderbilt Law Review.57  He received his B.A. from Wofford College 
and was a member of Phi Beta Kappa.58
It’s my great pleasure to welcome him here tonight and to introduce 
you to Commissioner Paul Atkins. 
FEATURED LECTURER 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: Thank you, Ben [Indek], for that kind 
introduction.  Thank you also, Dean Treanor, [Professor] Jill Fisch, and 
Mrs. Sommer.  Before I get started, and as all of you may expect, I need 
to tell you that the comments that I am about to make are my own and 
 53. Atkins Biography, supra note 39. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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do not necessarily reflect official SEC policy or the opinions of my 
fellow commissioners. 
 It is a true honor to be with you here today.  Over the last eight 
years, this lecture has become a prominent feature in the ongoing 
dialogue among securities regulators, practitioners, and the regulated 
community.  That is fitting, given that the lecture honors the legacy of 
former SEC Commissioner and former securities law practitioner, Al 
Sommer.  The SEC has seen many commissioners come and go over the 
last seventy-three years, and it would be difficult for even the most 
seasoned SEC veteran to name them all, much less point out their 
legacy.  But I am sure that many of even the newest securities 
practitioners have heard of Al Sommer and his legacy at the 
Commission.  At the SEC, Commissioner Sommer was extremely well-
regarded for his efforts to eliminate fixed commissions in the brokerage 
industry and his work in creating and overseeing an advisory committee 
on corporate disclosure that eventually resulted in the promulgation of 
Regulation S-K.59  Among other things, Regulation S-K was a much 
needed rationalization of the corporate disclosure rules;60 for once, there 
was essentially one place to go to find a set of integrated requirements.  
After he left the SEC, Commissioner Sommer made his mark in private 
practice, primarily at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, and in his role in the 
accounting industry’s Public Oversight Board and the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants.61
From a personal perspective, I very much enjoyed working with Al.  
When I worked for Chairman Richard Breeden in the early 1990s, Al 
was a great adviser and was always ready to help us accomplish what 
needed to be done.  For example, you might not think of Al as a party 
planner, but when we were searching for a way to be able to host the 
16th annual conference of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions,62 Al stepped in to head up a private committee that hosted 
several events to showcase the best and the brightest of the American 
capital markets for several hundred international guests.  At the time, the 
SEC had no budget for that sort of thing.  Al was also immensely kind.  
 59. 7 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2008). 
 60. See id. 
 61. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  For more information, 
please visit the AICPA website, http://www.aicpa.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 62. For more information, please visit the IOSCO website, http://www.iosco.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
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After I left the SEC, he continued to be a kind and helpful friend and 
advisor.   
I am honored to deliver this lecture tonight in Commissioner 
Sommer’s memory, particularly in the presence of his widow, Starr 
Sommer, his daughter and son-in-law. 
This evening I would like to talk about an issue that barely 
preceded, but substantially affected, Commissioner Sommer’s tenure at 
the SEC.  Before I reveal the topic, some background is in order. 
The SEC is fast approaching the 75th anniversary of its creation.  
Next year, of course, marks the 75th anniversary of the Securities Act of 
1933.63  Thereafter, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the 
SEC to keep the Federal Trade Commission out of the securities 
markets,64 which is a story full of political intrigue itself, and endowed it 
with a wide array of powers.65  Through legislative amendments, those 
powers have expanded since 193466 and the SEC also was charged with 
the administration of the federal securities statutes.67  Today, the SEC is 
charged with administering the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,68 the 
Investment Company69 and the Investment Advisers Acts of 1940,70 and 
certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,71 some of which fall 
 63. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). 
 64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006). 
 65. See id.; see generally Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 (noting some of the many powers 
granted by the 1934 Act, including regulating corporate reporting, proxy solicitations 
and tender offers). 
 66. E.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2006); 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-64; see generally U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (listing and 
explaining several key legislative acts created since the 1934 Act). 
 67. See sources cited supra note 66. 
 68. The Act applies to debt securities such as bonds, debentures, and notes that are 
offered for public sale. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2006). 
 69. The Act regulates the organization of companies, including mutual funds, that 
engage primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, and whose own 
securities are offered to the investing public. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-64 (2006). 
 70. The Act regulates investment advisors. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to b-21 (2006). 
 71. The Act mandated a number of reforms to enhance corporate responsibility and 
financial disclosures and to combat corporate and accounting fraud.  It also created the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee the activities of the auditing 
profession. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
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outside of the earlier securities laws.  That is a lot of statutory 
responsibility, but at least we finally were able to shed the responsibility 
for the now-dead Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.72
The SEC was created to be, and remains, primarily a disclosure 
agency.  In pursuing its statutory missions of protecting investors; 
maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital 
formation, the SEC since its inception has mandated public disclosure of 
current and accurate information from issuers and regulated entities.  
The theory behind a rigorous disclosure regime is that investors should 
have current, materially complete, and accurate information to make 
educated, informed investment decisions.  At the same time, however, 
investors should enter into the markets knowing that there is no 
governmental insurance policy protecting them from unwise decisions. 
Often, however, despite Commissioner Sommer’s legacy in Regulation 
S-K and efforts by others to promote transparency, disclosure rules are 
not enough.  Therefore, a necessary corollary to a disclosure regime is a 
program of strong enforcement.  If you make materially false disclosures 
or if you omit required disclosures, the SEC has and can bring a cause of 
action against you.73  With that in mind, Congress has given the SEC 
strong enforcement powers in the federal securities laws.  These powers 
have evolved—and increased—over time through legislation, regulation 
(just look at Rule 10b-5), and judicial interpretations.  To be sure, the 
arsenal of enforcement remedies possessed by today’s SEC, including 
the ability to penalize corporations, is markedly different from the stop 
orders and injunctions of 70 years ago.   
The current SEC enforcement program is highly visible and highly 
regarded.  The Division of Enforcement now has over eleven hundred 
staff members located in the home office in Washington and in the 
eleven regional offices.74  The staff brings hundreds of enforcement 
recommendations to the Commission each year (who’s counting, right?) 
and many other matters are investigated and then closed.  The 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 72. The Act provided for the regulation of electric utilities by the SEC. Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (repealed 2006). 
 73. See id. (stating that it is unlawful to make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact).
 74. The Division of Enforcement has regional offices in New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Miami, Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, Fort Worth, Salt Lake, Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the Division of 
Enforcement, http://sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
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enforcement staff investigates and recommends cases involving a wide 
range of activities, including Ponzi and pyramid schemes, bogus 
offerings, untrue disclosure, insider trading, market manipulation, a new 
wave of Internet intrusion matters, and the more esoteric, often very 
controversial, accounting cases.75  In every substantive area and in all of 
the SEC’s far-flung offices, the staff of the Division of Enforcement 
proves themselves every day to be professionals of the first rate. 
It comes as a surprise to many when they hear that the SEC has 
only had a standalone division of enforcement for 35 years—since 
1972.76  For the preceding 38 years of the Commission’s existence, 
enforcement was a function handled within each of the various 
regulatory divisions, but primarily in the Division of Trading and 
Markets.77   
I will not go into a whole lot of detail about the first 38 years of the 
Commission’s enforcement efforts.  However, that history plays a 
critical part in the evolution of the Enforcement Division, and so I will 
commend to your reading an article written by Dan Hawke, the director 
of the SEC’s Philadelphia Regional Office, for the SEC Historical 
Society. 78  That article, which you can find on the historical society’s 
website, is very comprehensive.  Many thanks to Dan Hawke for 
producing such an excellent piece—the quality of his work certainly 
comes as no surprise to me. 
I would like to focus on one event in the history of the SEC’s 
enforcement program that may well have been “the big bang” from 
which the current Division of Enforcement was born.  That event was 
the Wells Committee review back in 1972.  The Committee was a 
formal advisory committee created by Chairman William Casey.  In a 
 75. See Terence J. Lynam, Going to Trial Against the SEC, 26 BANKING & FIN. 
SERVS. POL’Y REP. 5 (2007) (discussing the different types of litigation the SEC 
undertakes). 
 76. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the Division of 
Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 
2008). 
 77. The Division of Trading and Markets was renamed the Division of Market 
Regulation in 1972.  However, in November 2007, the division reverted back to its 
previous title, the Division of Trading and Markets. U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrabout.shtml (last visited Feb. 
7, 2008). 
 78. Theodore A. Levine & Daniel M. Hawke, Sarbanes-Oxley: Back to the Future, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/2000/2003_0301_CLE_Sarbanes_Oxley.
pdf. 
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speech given to the New York State Bar Association in early 1972, 
Chairman Casey announced the formation of the committee, stating: 
[It is] essential for the Commission to redouble its efforts to keep in 
touch with the best thinking on investor protection at the private bar, 
in the accounting profession, and in the financial community 
generally.  As one step—and I hope that it will prove a significant 
step—toward that end, I have created a special committee of three 
highly experienced practicing lawyers who will, at my request, 
examine the SEC’s enforcement policy and practices, engage in 
frequent dialogue with the members of the Commission and with our 
staff, seek and sift the suggestions of the bar and make 
recommendations to the Commission for worthwhile improvements 
to our time-honored ways.79
Commissioner Casey appointed to constitute the Committee John 
A. Wells, who was in private practice at Royall, Koegel & Wells here in 
New York, and former SEC chairmen Manny F. Cohen and Ralph 
Demmler.80  Specifically, because Jack Wells was not a securities 
lawyer, Chairman Casey asked him to be the chairman of the committee, 
and thus began what we now know as the Wells Committee.81
In line with the comments in Chairman Casey’s speech, the 
committee’s express mandate82 was: (1) to advise on how the SEC’s 
enforcement objectives and strategies may be made still more 
effective,83 (2) to assess the due-process implications of the enforcement 
practices,84 (3) to evaluate the enforcement policies and procedures,85 
(4) to make recommendations on the appropriate blend of regulation, 
publicity and formal enforcement actions and on methods of furthering 
voluntary compliance,86 and (5) to make recommendations on criteria 
 79. William J. Casey, Chairman, SEC, “The Securities Bar and The Securities 
Laws,” Address at the New York State Bar Association: Banking, Corporation and 
Business Law Section 4-5 (Jan. 27, 1972), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/1972 
/012772casey.pdf (discussing the “Wells Committee,” although the committee was not 
yet termed as such). 
 80. Id. at 5. 
 81. Id. at 5-6. 
 82. Memorandum from John A. Wells et al., Chairman, SEC Advisory 
Commission on Enforcement Policies and Practices (Mar. 1, 1972), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1972_0302_Casey.pdf. 
 83. Id. at 1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2. 
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for the selection and disposition of enforcement actions and on the 
adequacy of sanctions imposed in SEC proceedings.87
The Wells Committee did not conduct extensive independent 
research and analysis.  Instead, the Committee solicited comment from 
“persons outside the Commission who were affected by the 
Commission’s enforcement activities.”88  The Committee started its 
work in January 1972, and published a report with forty-three 
recommendations for the Commission in June of the same year.89  
Although some believe the Wells Committee specifically recommended 
a standalone enforcement division, that is not true.  Chairman Casey, on 
his own initiative—but apparently with the advice of the Wells 
Committee—created the Enforcement Division shortly after the Wells 
Committee report was published.90  Depending on whom you listen to, 
Chairman Casey was either trying to build a national, high-profile 
enforcement program or he was simply trying to get Irv Pollack91 out of 
the regulation business.  No matter the reason, few would say that the 
move was a bad one.   
The most obvious product of the Wells Committee’s efforts was the 
SEC’s adoption of a formal “Wells process.”92  As most or all of you 
know, the Wells process allows for respondents in SEC proceedings to 
submit a writing—essentially a brief—to the Commission and its staff 
after the staff’s investigation is completed, but before the staff has made 
a recommendation to the Commission.93  In many ways, these “Wells 
Submissions,” operate as a last clear chance for respondents to persuade 
 87. Id. at 2. 
 88. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES (June 1, 1972), reprinted in ARTHUR F. 
MATHEWS ET AL., ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 1973, at 285 (Practising Law Institute 1973) [herineafter WELLS REPORT]. 
 89. Id. at 277-83. 
 90. The Division of Enforcement was created in August 1972, about two months 
after the Wells Committee Report was published. See Letter from William J. Casey, 
Chairman, SEC (Mar. 2, 1972), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/pap 
ers/1970/1972_0302_Casey.pdf. 
 91. Irving Meyer Pollack—Biography, http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuse 
action=attorneys.detail&site_id=301&emp_id=13229 (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 92. See Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, “Wells Submissions” to the SEC as Offers of 
Settlement under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Their Protection from Third-Party 
Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1912, 1912-13 (2002) (describing the Wells process). 
 93. Id. at 1913. 
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the staff that an enforcement recommendation is not warranted.  If that 
fails, the Wells Submissions are submitted to the Commission, along 
with a staff recommendation memorandum, so respondents are assured 
that the Commission has both sides of the story when it considers a 
recommendation in a contested matter.94
As an aside, believe it or not, when I returned to the SEC as a 
commissioner after eight years back in the private sector, the practice 
had developed of not providing commissioners with Wells Submissions 
in settled cases.  At the time, I was wondering why these materials for 
our closed Commission enforcement meetings had grown so thin!  Well, 
I changed that practice right away, at least with respect to my own 
office, and asked for all Wells Submissions and all substantive 
correspondence that is functionally equivalent to Wells Submissions.  It 
is very helpful to understand the evidence and the positions of all parties 
in the case, so I believe that the whole Commission should read Wells 
submissions even in settled matters. 
The appellation “Wells submission” suggests that the Wells 
Committee conceived the idea of allowing a respondent to submit a brief 
with opposing views before final Commission action.  However, the real 
credit for this process should go to former Chairman Hamer Budge95 
(who was also called Judge Budge from his service on the bench before 
he came to the SEC) and his fellow Commissioners.96  So, instead of a 
“Wells Submission,” we could call it a “Judge Budge Brief.”  A “Wells 
that Smells” because of shading facts or bad arguments could become a 
“Budge Fudge.”  A “Swell Wells,” on the other hand, could become a 
“Budge Nudge,” because it nudges the Commission in a different 
direction.  A truly exceptional one could be called a “Hamer Famer” 
because of its fame and acclaim.  A really long Wells—a “Hell’s Wells,” 
—would be a “Budge Trudge,” because it takes so long to get through it. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on the Death of Former Chairman Hamer H. 
Budge (July 28, 2003) (including a brief biography and obituary), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-88.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 96. While the Wells Commission in fact proposed the so-called Wells Submission, 
Hamer Budge and those SEC Commissioners following him are responsible for setting 
in motion the events leading to the formation of the Commission, and for adopting its 
proposals. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Historical Summary of 
Commissioners, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Feb. 
7, 2008). 
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Seriously, though, my jokes should not be construed to take away 
from my deep respect for the important work and legacy of Hamer 
Budge and Jack Wells.  I was just concerned that mid-way through my 
speech that you would be in high dudgeon if there were no levity (as a 
nod to my former boss, Arthur Levitt).97
So, back to history.  In 1970, just months before Chairman Budge 
left the SEC, the Commission issued a memo to all the division directors 
and office heads regarding procedures to be followed in enforcement 
proceedings.98  The memo had two significant components: (1) it 
required the staff to get Commission approval before engaging in any 
settlement discussions,99 and (2) it required the staff to provide a 
summary of the defendant’s arguments in recommendation memos sent 
to the Commission.100  The latter requirement became a subject of study 
by the Wells Committee and resulted in the following Wells Committee 
recommendation to the Commission: 
Except where the nature of the case precludes, a prospective 
defendant or respondent should be notified of the substance of the 
Staff’s charges and probable recommendations in advance of the 
submission of the Staff memorandum to the Commission 
recommending the commencement of an enforcement action and be 
accorded an opportunity to submit a written statement to the Staff 
which would be forwarded to the Commission together with the Staff 
memorandum.101
The Wells Committee also recommended that this process be 
formalized in SEC rules.102  The Commission agreed with these 
recommendations, and they were eventually codified in SEC procedural 
rules.103  However, because the Commission was faced with “strong 
opposition from its enforcement staff,” the published version differed 
from the recommendation in a few respects.  The most significant nod to 
 97. Arthur Levitt—Biography, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/levitt.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 98. See Memorandum from the Commission to All Division Directors and Office 
Heads, Regarding Procedures Followed in the Institution of Enforcement Proceedings 
(Sept. 1, 1970), reprinted in SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157, 165 app. 
A (D.D.C. 1975). 
 99. Id. at 165-66, app. A. 
 100. Id. at 166, app. A. 
 101. WELLS REPORT, supra note 88, at 279. 
 102. Naftalis, supra note 92, at 1918. 
 103. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2006). 
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the staff was language stating that the staff would have discretion in 
deciding whether to advise a respondent of: the nature of the 
investigation, the potential charges, and the amount of time available to 
send a written submission.104
Unlike the Wells submission process, most of the Wells Committee 
recommendations were not adopted by the Commission.105  Looking at 
the 43 recommendations,106 it makes you wonder how things would be 
different today if the Commission had expressly addressed all of them 
35 years ago.  Indeed, many of the recommendations remain highly 
relevant today—and some should give the current Commission a serious 
case of déjà vu. 
The first Wells Committee recommendation was for an SEC 
planning office “whose primary purpose would be to identify emerging 
regulatory and enforcement problems and to develop a coordinated 
response by the Commission.”107  Of course, a former chairman created 
just such a group—the Office of Risk Assessment—a few years ago in 
response to some of the scandals that the SEC had not anticipated.108  
Despite what would seem to be the timeless wisdom of a planning 
office, it has only had limited success.  This is not because of a lack of 
talent in that particular office, but is probably due more to the SEC’s 
ages-old problem with a lack of inter-division and inter-office 
cooperation.  I hope that the Commission will soon be able to breathe 
new life into that office. 
Recommendation 20 in the Wells Committee report is another blast 
from the past.  That recommendation was for the Commission to “adopt 
procedures permitting discussions of settlement between the staff and 
the prospective defendant or respondent prior to authorization of a 
proceeding.”109  This was a response to the 1970 Chairman Budge 
memo.  Apparently, some commenters in the Wells Committee process 
felt strongly that the settlement authorization procedures in the Budge 
memo should not be continued.  Boy, does that sound familiar!  Well, 
 104. See id. 
 105. Compare WELLS REPORT, supra note 88, with 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c). 
 106. See WELLS REPORT, supra note 88. 
 107. Id. at 277. 
 108. See William Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Speech to Detroit Economic Club 
(Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102904whd.htm 
(discussing corporate corruption scandals such as Enron and Worldcom, and the SEC’s 
response). 
 109. WELLS REPORT, supra note 88, at 280. 
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the Casey Commission110 did not agree, perhaps for due process 
concerns and to retain Commission prerogatives, so for all intents and 
purposes, the Budge memo and its procedures are still binding 
Commission policy today.  In fact, in 1979, the Commission, under 
Chairman Harold Williams,111 who was very concerned with due-
process and procedure, formally adopted in the SEC procedural rules a 
requirement that the enforcement staff must have Commission 
authorization before engaging in settlement discussions.112
With all of this precedent, and considering that the 1979 rule is still 
on our books, it makes you wonder why there was so much clamor when 
the Commission recently started enforcing that policy in corporate issuer 
penalty cases.  The backlash is especially odd given that the issuer 
penalty cases constitute about five percent or less of the SEC’s annual 
enforcement docket.113  I imagine that much of the criticism arises from 
a lack of public guidance on how the SEC is implementing this new 
policy—or should I say, this “new old” policy, and I would hope that—
if the Commission decides to continue with the procedure—detailed 
formal guidance will be provided in the near future. 
Several other of the Wells Committee recommendations deserve the 
attention of the current and future Commissions, and not all of them 
relate to with the enforcement function.  For instance, recommendation 5 
would have the Commission promptly reflect staff interpretive positions 
in published revisions of applicable rules and policies.114  Because such 
revisions would be subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), I 
believe that recommendation 5 was, and is, an appropriate idea.  And, 
the problem of substantive staff guidance being provided outside the 
APA115 is even more acute today than it was in 1972—we now have 35 
years of additional staff guidance to deal with.  Recently, for example, 
under Alan Beller, the Corporation Finance Division began to publish 
 110. “Casey Commission” refers to the period between April 14, 1971 and February 
2, 1973 during which William J. Casey was Chairman of the SEC. U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Commissioner History, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistorical 
summary.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 111. Harold M. Williams—Biography, http://skadden.com/index.cfm?contentID=45 
&bioID=848. 
 112. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (2006). 
 113. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/sec 
par2006.pdf. 
 114. WELLS REPORT, supra note 88, at 277. 
 115. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. prec. § 500 (LexisNexis 2007). 
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staff comment letters on disclosure filings so that all issuers and 
practitioners have access to the information. 
As much as I would like to discuss each of the 43 recommendations 
with you, I realize that my time—and your patience—is limited.  So I 
will mention only one more.  In recommendation 13, the Wells 
Committee advised the Commission to ensure that examination and 
enforcement staff have, and maintain, proper polices and procedures 
manuals.116  Although this recommendation may have been loosely and 
informally adhered to over the years, this issue has become a hot topic 
following the recent issuance of highly critical reports117 by Senators 
Grassley118 and Specter119 and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO).120  Both of these reports find significant shortcomings with the 
Division of Enforcement’s written policies and procedures.121  This is a 
serious issue, and one I know and expect the Chairman, the 
Commission, and the Enforcement Division senior staff will carefully 
examine and remedy.  I should not like others to criticize the SEC for 
being unresponsive if we do not consider these common-sense 
suggestions from Congress and from the GAO.   
Although most of the recommendations proposed by the Wells 
Committee in its report were not adopted by the Commission, the Wells 
process remains the SEC’s central due process mechanism in 
 116. WELLS REPORT, supra note 88, at 279. 
 117. See STAFF OF S. FINANCE COMM., 110TH CONG., REPORT ON THE FIRING OF AN 
SEC ATTORNEY AND THE INVESTIGATION OF PEQUOT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Comm. 
Print 2007), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202007/Leg%20 
110%20080307%20SEC.pdf [hereinafter PEQUOT REPORT]; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-830, SEC: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
ENSURE PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS ADDRESS LIMITATIONS IN ENFORCEMENT DIVISION 
OPERATIONS (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07830.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 118. Senator Chuck Grassley—Biography, http://grassley.senate.gov/public/index.c 
fm?FuseAction=Biography.Home (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 119. Senator Arlen Specter—Biography, http://specter.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? 
FuseAction=AboutArlenSpecter.Biography (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 120. See GAO REPORT, supra note 117. 
 121. See PEQUOT REPORT, supra note 117 (criticizing the SEC’s firing of SEC 
lawyer Gary Aguirre, alleging that political considerations were behind Aguirre’s 
dismissal); GAO REPORT, supra note 117 (finding that the SEC’s decentralized data 
management led to inefficiencies in investigation, staffing, and distributing monies to 
harmed investors, and that while steps are being taken to improve the situation, more 
must be done). 
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enforcement matters.122  But, after 30 years, even the Wells process has 
its challenges.  The corporate scandals of recent years and the market’s 
jitters over the effect of potential enforcement problems on a 
corporation’s management and business, combined with today’s 
disclosure practices (and sky-high legal bills), make it difficult for the 
spirit of the Wells process—giving someone the ability to tell their side 
before the SEC takes public action—to run its course as originally 
intended. 
I believe that advisory committees like the Wells Committee can 
play a key role in the review and improvement of SEC rules and 
processes, and in fact, they have performed such a function many times 
over the years.  I, in fact, helped to set up for a number of them to good 
effect under Chairmen Richard Breeden and Arthur Levitt.  Chairman 
Casey was exactly right—in order to satisfy the SEC’s statutory 
missions, it is incumbent on the Commission to seek the best advice 
from outside sources, including the securities bar and the regulated 
community to refine the agency’s policies and practices.123  This is 
critical not only for our investor protection purposes, but also for the 
Commission to satisfy its mandates to facilitate capital formation and 
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets.124
To that end, I welcome the idea of new advisory committees to 
review the functions of our divisions and offices.  In light of the many 
issues raised in the three recent capital markets competitiveness 
reports,125 the 2006 Chamber of Commerce report on the SEC 
 122. See Rules of Practice, SEC Release No. 34-35833, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738, at 
*160 (June 9, 1995) (stating that, in most cases, at the close of an investigation the SEC 
notifies the respondent of its general conclusions and affords the respondent an 
opportunity to submit a Wells Statement presenting its arguments against the 
commencement of an action). 
 123. The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. William J. Casey, Chairman, SEC, 
Address to the National Association of Investment Clubs: America Needs the Small 
Investor (Oct. 5, 1972), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/1972/100572casey.pdf. 
 124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2007) (“Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the 
Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether 
an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also 
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”). 
 125. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKT. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (Nov. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf; COMM’N 
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enforcement program,126 and the Congressional127 and GAO reports,128 I 
think it is clear that this would be a good time for a new “Wells-like” 
advisory committee to review the policies and procedures of our 
enforcement program.  The Commission and staff should welcome, not 
fear, such a review. 
You all have been a very patient audience, and I appreciate your 
attention tonight.  I welcome your active involvement in the issues I 
discussed today, and all of your issues.  My phone and office are always 
open to you.  Please call or stop by if you have any comments or 
concerns.  Thank you again for your time and attention. 
Professor Fisch has asked if I will take some questions.  Since I am 
just keeping you away from your cocktails, I would be happy to do that 
for a while. 
QUESTION: Commissioner Atkins, thanks for coming today. 
In your op-ed this morning, you came out against private litigants 
taking action for the aiding and abetting of securities fraud.129  Do you 
think that the SEC’s current enforcement techniques are sufficient to 
discourage this type of behavior in the future?  If not, what do you think 
about it? 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: That is a good question.  I should 
probably repeat it for folks in the overflow room. 
Basically, in light of the case that was argued today, Stoneridge,130 
do I think that the current SEC enforcement powers—and also, I should 
add, the Justice Department’s enforcement powers—are sufficient to 
keep untoward activity of miscreants in check? 
ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), available at 
http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com/portal/capmarkets/default.htm; MICHAEL R. 
BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE U.S.’ 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at 
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_
REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf. 
 126. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT 
PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (2006), available at 
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0603sec.htm. 
 127. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf. 
 128. GAO REPORT, supra note 117. 
 129. See Atkins, Just Say No, supra note 21. 
 130. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 
2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007) (No. 06-43). 
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In fact, I do.  This is a complicated question.  I respect very much 
Jill’s submission to the Supreme Court and the other side of the 
argument.131
From my perspective, there are lots of players in this.  We have to 
remember that primary liability and, as the Solicitor General argued, a 
reliance, from an investor’s perspective, are two very powerful and 
competing, but also contrasting sorts of elements of the case here.  An 
investor can always sue, with respect to somebody who has primary 
liability, somebody who was intimately involved in the fraud, and can be 
shown to have had direct knowledge of and participation in that.  An 
attorney, for example, who knew and saw his opinion being used to 
attract investors out there, who actually knew it was going to be used for 
that particular case, I think, arguably, could get caught up as a primary 
violator, even under current law.  Of course, always, the facts play a big 
role in that.  But it all comes down to knowledge and involvement. 
But once you start stepping away from that, once you start getting 
into notions of aiding and abetting, and people that investors had no idea 
were even involved—people, for example, whether they are vendors or 
customers or others, who had dealings with the miscreant, with the 
person who actually deceived the investors—when you combine that 
with our notion these days of qualitative materiality, where even the last 
dollar of revenue that puts the miscreant over his bogey that he is trying 
to meet with respect to analysts on the Street and props up the stock, we 
have seen enforcement cases and others where we have gone after 
people for their involvement in those sorts of things. 
So if you start expanding this notion in the private realm, beyond 
the government realm, I think you are opening up huge potential liability 
for people.  You have to realize that in today’s environment, where the 
urge to settle is much stronger than the willingness to fight to vindicate 
your rights and to vindicate your innocence—I think we are dealing with 
a very powerful and detrimental force for the U.S. capital markets that 
will have huge repercussions worldwide.  This sort of liability could get 
people who are not necessarily even subject to U.S. securities laws, not 
even SEC registrants, and have them caught up in the web of liability 
under the securities laws. 
 131. See Brief for Professors James D. Cox et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 
(2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701606. 
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That is a longwinded answer.  It is a very complicated question.  
We will see how the Supreme Court rules on it.132  But I think, from the 
reports I heard, the right questions were being asked today, and it 
sounded like, needless to say, an engaged bench. 
QUESTION: Following up that question, then, considering Judge 
Lewis Kaplan’s decision in U.S. v. Stein,133 the so-called KPMG case, 
why do you think that a federal judge cannot sort out these distinctions, 
very sophisticated distinctions like this, that the SEC has also assigned 
on primary and secondary liability—why can a federal judge sort these 
out in a criminal case of the Department of Justice, and not in a private 
case with private litigants? 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: The question is, why cannot a federal 
judge sort out these secondary liability issues, if you look at the KPMG 
case and things like that, which are very complicated, similar types of 
questions before the judge? 
That is a point, obviously.  But it’s not necessarily a question of 
whether the judge can sort it out.  Ultimately, the facts will be what they 
are, and the finder of fact, whether it is a judge or a jury, more 
importantly, can look at it.  But you have to realize how these cases get 
filed.  They get filed, and there is discovery134 and there is motion 
practice.135  Most of them actually never even find their way to a 
courtroom to be sorted out.  They are settled beforehand, with the 
plaintiff’s attorneys taking their cut of the pot, even when it extends to 
billions of dollars, and investors getting paid what they will. 
So it’s the cost/benefit of having all of this sorted out in a private 
setting versus in a government setting.  I would submit that if we follow 
the current law, the Central Bank decision136 back in the mid-1990s—
the Supreme Court there came to a balance of government action versus 
private action.137  We have to remember that ultimately the private 
enforcement of 10b-5138 and 10b139 is a judicially crafted response,140 
 132. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 
(2008) (finding for the defendants, holding that the implied private right of action under 
section 10(b) does not extend to aiders or abettors and that the defendants did not 
engage in deceptive conduct or commit misstatements on which the plaintiffs relied). 
 133. 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 134. See FED R. CIV. P. 26.
 135. See FED R. CIV. P. 7.
 136. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 137. Id. at 171-73. 
 138. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
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back in the 1940s, I guess, or whenever it was.  It was not necessarily an 
intent of Congress. 
QUESTION: With investors having increased opportunity to invest 
in global markets now—I know with E-Trade,141 for instance, an 
investor is able to invest in foreign stock exchanges, not only in the 
United States—do you foresee any consolidation in terms of regulation 
of those investors or something along those lines?  How would that 
work? 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: The question is, with respect to the 
growing ability of U.S. investors to invest directly abroad, will there be 
growing interaction among regulators to harmonize their regulations and 
work in common? 
I think so.  We are seeing that already.  It is an amazing aspect of 
the current global financial markets that investors, because of the 
amazing increase in telecommunications and whatnot—the Internet—are 
able to invest directly abroad.  We have seen how the private sector has 
responded to that challenge.  You mentioned E-Trade.  Some other 
broker-dealers are allowing investors, with a click of a mouse, to invest 
directly abroad. 
That is an amazing change and one that I think regulators have to 
take into account, and one that, getting back to Stoneridge and some of 
these questions of liability and the costs that are imposed on people that 
do business here in this country, we have to take into account.  If we 
look at these competitiveness reports142 that have come out within the 
last year, I think they point out that litigation costs and other things that 
people are looking at here, which I have heard directly from folks 
abroad, are taking their toll on us. 
If you look in 2006, that was the first year ever that the private 
institutional capital markets, the Rule 144A capital markets,143 saw more 
 139. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 140. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (“Although [section] 
10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is 
no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, 
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of 
the statute and the Rule is now well established.”). 
 141. E-Trade Financial, Mutual Funds & ETFs, https://us.etrade.com/e/t/investingan 
dtrading/mutualfundsandetfs?fundfamily=0&fund_fee_code=0 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2008) (asserting E-Trade’s claim to allow its customers access to every exchange-traded 
fund sold). 
 142. See sources cited supra note 126. 
 143. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2007).
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capital raised in that market than in the public markets, which I think is 
pretty remarkable.  Why is that?  I think we need to look and see what is 
going on.  We have to be introspective a little bit and take a look at our 
rules.  These various reports have come out, and I am sure more are 
coming.  We need to make sure that the costs and benefits that we have 
with respect to how we are regulating the securities markets are in 
balance. 
QUESTION: To build up on that, litigation is one factor, but some 
would be critical that the SEC has not taken the leadership to try to 
address what regulatory changes might be necessary.  There is an 
argument that our regulatory system is antiquated, where investors have 
access globally, and it’s an inefficient way of doing business.  Why 
hasn’t the SEC been willing to take the lead in trying to deal with how 
we can more efficiently regulate cross-border transactions? 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: Great question.  The question is, 
litigation is one factor, which I agree with, and there has been some 
criticism as to why the SEC is not being more active in looking at how 
our regulations—our regulations are antiquated—and how they could be 
updated to make them more effective in the modern world. 
That is a big issue.  We have had a lot on our plate over the last few 
years.  I am not trying to make any excuses.  I think we are taking steps 
to try to look to see how we can update our regulatory rulebook, as it 
were.  The chairman himself has personally taken on XBRL,144 which is 
a disclosure system using this extensible business reporting language.  It 
is a way of tagging filings that are submitted by public companies so 
that investors can manipulate the information more easily to fit their 
uses. 
For example, we have a proposal outstanding now to recognize 
international accounting reporting standards, IFRS,145 so that there will 
no longer be a reconciliation requirement for foreign companies to come 
and issue their securities here in the United States.  This is an old rule 
that dates way back to the 1970s or so.  The U.S. at the time was the 
 144. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chairman Cox Announces 
Landmark Progress in Providing Instant, User-Friendly Access to Financial Reporting 
Information for Investors (Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2007/2007-200.htm; see also XBRL International, Extensible Business Reporting 
Language, http://www.xbrl.org/Home/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 145. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Soliciting Public 
Comment on Eliminating Reconciliation Requirement for IFRS Financial Statements 
(July 3, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-128.htm. 
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biggest capital market in the world.  You had a huge panoply of all sorts 
of GAAPs,146 generally accepted accounting principles, across all sorts 
of different countries.  The SEC threw up its hands and basically said, 
“If you want to issue securities here, please reconcile your home 
country’s disclosure to ours.” 
Now, because of the onset of IFRS147 and the European 
Community’s mandating of IFRS across the whole European Union,148 
we have this proposal to do away with the reconciliation requirement 
and, in fact, recognize IFRS as on par with U.S. GAAP.149
That raises a corollary question.  If we think that IFRS is okay for 
U.S. investors to understand it and to treat it side by side with U.S. 
GAAP, then why shouldn’t an American company, if it has a lot of 
business abroad and if it has a lot of investors abroad, be able to report 
with IFRS?  I think it’s a great question.  We have a concept release 
outstanding, and I encourage you all to read it and comment on it.150
So we are taking issue.  We can do a lot more.  We are talking now 
about mutual recognition.  Whoever thought the SEC would be talking 
about such an issue of recognizing, actually, foreign regulatory regimes?  
But that is now being discussed. 
I think some of the suggestions are not really realistic.  They 
contemplate sort of a bottom-up approach of lining up the regulations 
here in the United States and comparing them to all the ones that—pick 
your foreign jurisdiction—seeing where they are the same and where 
 146. See Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 147. International Financial Reporting Standards are accounting standards and 
interpretations promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board, a non-
profit organization committed to developing a single set of global accounting standards. 
International Accounting Standards Board, http://www.iasb.org/Home.htm (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2008). 
 148. See Press Release, Comm. of European Sec. Regulators, CESR Begins Work 
on Implementing Measures to Establish Equivalence Between Third Countries GAAP 
and IAS/IFRS and Launches a Call for Evidence (June 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cesr/15-04.pdf. 
 149. Subsequent to this Lecture, the SEC adopted the rule allowing foreign private 
issuers to file financial statements prepared in accordance with IRFS without 
reconciliation to GAAP. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial 
Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4, 2008) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, and 249). 
 150. Id. 
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they differ, and then trying to harmonize them.  Ultimately, once they 
get harmonized, then we can wave a wand and say, “Thou art mutually 
recognized.” 
That will never work, because, as you all know, things change, and 
by the time you go through one rulebook, say, of the FSA,151 which is 
pretty thick—by the time you get to the end, you might as well start 
over, because things will have changed on our side or their side. 
I think a better approach would be a top-down approach, like the 
Commodities Future Trading Commission has, or the Fed, where they 
look to see where there are common principles, whether we approach 
regulation in a similar way, and then how we can get comfortable that 
we are all on the same page.  Then you look at individual firms.  I think 
that is a much more realistic approach.  That might be achieved in my 
lifetime, and maybe yours, too. 
In the meantime, we shouldn’t allow this academic type of 
discussion to deflect us from the real changes that need to be done, that 
are crying out to be done.  For example, Rule 15a-6152 is the one that 
governs how foreign broker-dealers can do business in the United States.  
It’s very complicated.  Basically, they have to call up and say, “U.S. 
broker-dealer, would you mind being my chaperone while I go to the 
dance with a U.S. investor?”  This was actually a watershed when it was 
adopted by the Commission back in the 1980s.  It’s now an example of 
what you talk about as being very antiquated.  That needs to be revised 
as soon as possible, at least with respect to institutional investors. 
We have a lot of work to do. 
QUESTION: In relation to 404153 and 302154 certifications, I know 
PCAOB155 came out with guidance for public accounting firms, and then 
SEC came out with management guidance in terms of compliance 
 151. Financial Services Authority.  For more information, please visit the FSA 
website, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/. 
 152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2007). 
 153. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
 154. Id. § 7241. 
 155. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 364-69 
(2002) (describing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a non-
governmental, non-profit organization consisting of five members appointed by the 
SEC after consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Secretary of the Treasury).  Its primary function is to “carry out the requirements of the 
[Sarbanes-Oxley Act] and to enforce compliance with the Act by registered public 
accounting firms and associated persons thereof, as required by Section 101(d) of the 
Act.” Id. 
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audits.  How does the dialogue go back and forth between PCAOB and 
SEC to make sure that when you do your recommendations, there is not 
an overkill? 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: I see.  Good question.  I will repeat 
that for you all.  The question is, with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley 404156 
and the other certifications that need to be done, we have recently come 
out with revisions.  PCAOB, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, had its Auditing Standard 2,157 which we threw out, and we 
brought in Auditing Standard 5158 to try to make it much more cost-
effective, because—well, it’s a long story.  Auditing Standard 2,159 we 
all know, was very costly and was overkill.  It drove accountants, I 
think, to much more work than was contemplated or than is necessary. 
The question is, how do we interact with the Accounting Oversight 
Board to make sure that things mesh? 
That’s a great question.  I think, when you look at the process of 
404160 and our implementation of it, how that came about, it shows, 
really, a good working relationship between the SEC and the PCAOB.  
Of course, the PCAOB’s constitutionality is being challenged and is 
being appealed now, after a decision in the district court.161  It is being 
appealed up to the D.C. Circuit.  In the brief that the government filed in 
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 7262. 
 157. See PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, RULES OF THE BOARD 
152 (2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_ 
Standard_2.pdf (stating that Auditing Standard 2 has been superseded by Standard No. 
5 for audits of fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007) [hereinafter PCAOB 
2]. 
 158. See PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, RULES OF THE BOARD 
396 (2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_ 
Standard_5.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB 5]. 
 159. See Press Release, SEC Approves PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 Regarding 
Audits of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting; Adopts Definition of “Significant 
Deficiency” (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-
144.htm (calling Auditing Standard No. 2 “unduly expensive and inefficient”); see also 
JEFFERSON WELLS, PCAOB DISCUSSES CHANGING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.jeffersonwells.com/Knowledge/Internal/PCAOB_AS2_Chan 
ge.pdf (discussing the merits of making revisions to the auditing standard). 
 160. 15 U.S.C. § 7262; see Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., SEC 
Implements Internal Control Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Adopts Investment 
Company R&D Safe Harbor (May 27, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/pre 
ss/2003-66.htm. 
 161. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, No. 06-0217, 2007 WL 891675, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 21, 2007). 
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that case, basically it said that the SEC has plenary authority over 
PCAOB.162  We appoint their members, we approve their budget, we 
approve their rules, and we hear appeals from any enforcement actions 
that they take.163
I take that very seriously.  That’s why at one point Commissioner 
Glassman164 and I, a few years ago, demanded that we have a public 
meeting of the Commission to ask questions of the PCAOB with respect 
to their budget and have some sort of accountability as to where their 
budget stands.  I feel strongly about that.  You saw last year that we had 
that.  I hope in the future that that continues. 
So budgetary authority is one hook that we have.  But, basically, we 
both are striving for the same sort of result.  We both want to protect 
investors.  We both want to ensure that there is a robust and effective 
auditing profession.  Of course, that is the first line of defense that 
investors have against people who would lie, cheat, and steal.  So we 
definitely need to concentrate on that. 
When rules go awry, as Auditing Standard 2165 did—we just heard 
and saw evidence of much more work—as I said, overwork—that was 
done and bills that were sky-high, and then the specter of having these 
sorts of practices then being applied to smaller companies, which could 
ill afford them.  I can go into lots of stories about companies, little 
biotech companies, for example, that are public, but have no incoming 
revenue because they are waiting to have their drugs approved by the 
FDA.  Basically, they are paying more to accountants and lawyers and 
consultants than they are paying to their CFO and all the people 
reporting to the CFO to put these financial reports together.  That is an 
untenable situation from an investor’s perspective. 
So we took action, I think, very fast and very effectively, for the 
SEC to come out with management guidance, as you mentioned, giving 
something for companies to stand on so that they can wave that in front 
of their auditors, in case their auditors want to go overboard, and then 
 162. See Memorandum of Proposed Intervenor United States in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of United States’ Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3, Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, No. 06-217, 2007 
WL 891675 (D.D.C. 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/2006/2006-
147_brief.pdf. 
 163. Id. at 4-5. 
 164. Cynthia A. Glassman—Biography, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/ 
glassman.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 165. PCAOB 2, supra note 157. 
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also revise Auditing Standard 2166 and Auditing Standard 5,167 to allow 
much more professional judgment, so that the auditors could exercise 
that, rather than feeling that they have to go to a prescriptive rulebook. 
Hopefully, these steps that we have taken will yield fruit—and I 
mean to the bottom line, for the investor’s benefit.  If not, then we try, 
try again.  We will have to readdress it.  Congress, of course, is on our 
case, as they should be.  There is a provision that the House put into our 
budget that would, in a sense, forbid us to spend any money enforcing 
404168 with respect to smaller companies.  We will see how that 
proceeds through Congress.  We hear people loud and clear, and I think 
we have taken good measures.  I think it shows how we have a very 
cooperative relationship with the PCAOB. 
QUESTION: We were told that one of the previous speakers was 
Elliott Spitzer.  I am interested in what you think about the role in the 
regulation of U.S. securities markets of the attorney general of the state 
of New York? 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: The question is, my view of the 
appropriate role of the office of the attorney general in regulating the 
securities markets. 
We have fifty attorneys general.  One of them is armed with the 
Martin Act,169 of course, which is very broad and gives broad powers, 
both civil and criminal.170  I will leave it to the State of New York to sort 
that out as to whether or not they think that is effective with respect to 
the securities business, which, obviously, is a very important business to 
the state and city of New York. 
I have to say that foreigners, in particular, are perplexed by our 
regulatory structure here in the United States.  When you look at the 
insurance side, when you look at the securities side, we have fifty state 
regulators, and then we have the feds, with the SEC and CFTC and the 
Justice Department.  I think we have our work cut out for us to try to 
make sense of this quilt that we have of regulatory overlap. 
I think it has worked very well in the past, where we have had 
cooperation between states and federal officials.  I have many friends—I 
am, in fact, the liaison from the SEC with respect to the state regulators, 
 166. Id. 
 167. PCAOB 5, supra note 158. 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
 169. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Art. 23-A (Consol. 2007). 
 170. Id. 
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the North American Securities Administrators Association.171  I think 
there has been very good cooperation between the federal government, 
SEC, and the states on various matters.  I would really hold that out as a 
model. 
Regardless of what has happened in the past, I would encourage 
state officials to talk to us and work with us, and not do regulation or 
action through press release and other things.  Due process is something 
that I, from my remarks, hold near and dear to my heart.  I think it’s 
incumbent on us, with the power of the government, whether it is federal 
or state, to respect due process and to respect our fellow regulators.  If 
not, obviously we have Congress and others who can always step in to 
sort out questions of federalism as between preemption and other things.  
But right now I would hope that the system works well. 
QUESTION: There has been talk in the past about combining the 
SEC and CFTC.  I know in Britain that they do that.172  I was just 
wondering what your thoughts are, if it would be more efficient, in your 
opinion, or what the result would be. 
COMMISSIONER ATKINS: The question is, do I think we should 
combine the SEC and the CFTC, in view of what has gone on in other 
countries, in Britain, FSA and others.  I might add, Korea is one,173 and 
others. 
I leave that to Congress, really, to decide.  How about that for 
punting? 
We get along, I think, very well with the CFTC.  Their markets are 
much different than ours, for the most part.  They have a very 
institutional market.  Obviously, they have some retail component as 
well.  But their rules and whatnot are dissimilar to ours.  I am not saying 
that the two couldn’t coexist.  But I think, especially since the growth of 
the President’s Working Group,174 which sort of brings together, on an 
 171. North American Securities Administrators Association, Welcome to NASAA: 
The Voice of State and Provincial Securities Regulators, 
http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA (stating the mission of NASAA is to protect 
“consumers who purchase securities or investment advice”). 
 172. See Cole Lecture, supra note 33. 
 173. See Financial Supervisory Commission, http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/id/id0301.jsp 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 174. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Stock-Fall Study Gets Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
1988, at 13 (defining the President’s Working Group as the President’s “interagency 
committee that seeks to produce a unified series of White House recommendations on 
how to avoid another stock market crash”).  The committee consists of the Under 
Secretary of the Treasury for Finance and the chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board, 
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informal basis, the work of the financial regulators—I think that is a 
good solution for now.  I leave it to Congress to decide. 
PROF. FISCH: Thank you so much.  I think we have caused you to 
overextend yourself, but let me offer to buy you a drink.  For all of you 
out there as well, the bar is open.
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission. Id. 
